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\begin{document}

\title{The Large Hadron Collider}


\author{George}

\maketitle
\tableofcontents{}


\section*{Part A) Case Study}


\subsection*{Concept}

While CERN’s earliest concepts for a Large Hadron Collider can be
traced back to 1977\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{2}, the detailed
planning for the project began in 1995. Thus, under the Project Lifecycle
model, the extended Concept Phase ran for almost 2 decades. This is
partially explained by the project having not been formally approved
until the presentation of the equivalent of a project charter in 1994,\textsuperscript{ 3}
after much work had already been carried out.\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{6}.

Even in 1977 -- with the first plans only beginning to hatch -- it
was proposed to build the LHC in the Large Electron Positron Collider
(LEP) tunnel after the LEP experiments were brought to a close. The
LEP had only just been completed in 1975\textsuperscript{1}. A Feasibility
Study was conducted in 1984 \textsuperscript{3}. In 1987, the LHC
was almost canned, as the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) was
approved in the US, however Nobel Prize winner Carlo Rubbia continued
to push for it\textsuperscript{1}. He claimed it would be a much
higher quality collider (predicting higher Luminosity) than the SSC
\textsuperscript{1}, He also suggested it would be more versatile
and able to collide heavy ions as well as Hadrons\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{6}.
Rubbia became the Director General of CERN in 1989\textsuperscript{1}.
In 1993, the SSC was terminated due to costing mistakes: the expected
cost had been revised from \$4.4 billion to over \$11 billion\textsuperscript{3}.

In the Concept stage of the LHC project there were two major meetings
of CERN Council: the 1991 meeting where the project was proposed and
the 1994 meeting where the project was approved after the presentation
of a document similar to a Project Charter. 

The project was initially presented to the CERN Council, in 1991\textsuperscript{5}.
The goal presented was: For the advancement of high energy particle
physics, there is a need to study constituent collisions at energies
of greater than 1TeV.\textsuperscript{7} The constituent energy (energy
imparted onto the subparticles of those collided) was calculated to
be about 10\% of the particle energy. It was deemed that -- due to
the technological constraints of the time -- the only way to do this
in the next 10 years was with Hadron Collisions \textsuperscript{7}.
After discussion of other options, it was agreed that “In all these
respects (advancement of science, nature of machine, preliminary costs
estimates), the LHC is the right machine for the advancement of the
subject and the future of CERN”\textsuperscript{8}. 

The triple bottom line considerations discussed in 1991 were: 
\begin{itemize}
\item Environmental 

\begin{itemize}
\item There will be no direct effect from the experiments that will eventually
be carried out on the environment. Radiation will extremely low at
ground level: not detectable above background. The LHC will be sufficiently
well shielded to minimize radiation leaks \textsuperscript{6}. 
\item The LHC will be more energy efficient than the existing Super Proton
Synchrotron (SPS), which was CERN’s main hadron collider as the time.
Yearly energy consumption “remarkably small considering enhancement
it brings to physics”: 25 times the collision energy and 10 000 luminosity
at the same power usage. \textsuperscript{6} 
\end{itemize}
\item Social

\begin{itemize}
\item Having particle accelerators was considered an important part of the
European cultural identity.\textsuperscript{5}
\end{itemize}
\item Financial

\begin{itemize}
\item Funded at present budgetary level, but additional contributions should
be encouraged with industrial incentives. Non-member contributions
can accepted in work or in cash. \textsuperscript{7} 
\item Extremely cost effective as using previous investments in civil engineering
(LEP tunnel), and Injector Accelerators (the SSP).\textsuperscript{7} 
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
The Director General was asked to provide more details on
\begin{itemize}
\item final costs, 
\item technical feasibility,
\item involvement of stakeholders (member and non-member states),
\item final experimental use, with regard to 

\begin{itemize}
\item goals; 
\item Ongoing direct costs to CERN;
\item Indirect cost to other stakeholder.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
and other factors to the Council in 1993 \textsuperscript{8} In 1994
CERN Council discussed these recommendations, which basically formed
a project charter. \textsuperscript{3}

The project charter-like document “The Large Hadron Collider Project”
-- hereafter referred to as the Project Charter for brevity -- was
presented in 1994. It included of a summary of 9 documents which had
been presented over the prior 6 months \textsuperscript{3}, covering: 
\begin{itemize}
\item background information on CERN, and particle physics in general; 
\item semi-detailed designs for the machine;
\item the experimental program once the machine was completed, including
costings;
\item cost estimates (2230 Million Swiss Francs at 1993 value) and funding.
\end{itemize}
This document also discussed the stakeholders: CERN, member-states,
non-member states, the International Committee for Future Accelerators
(ICFA) and scientists across the world \textsuperscript{ 9}. It gave
consideration to the impact of the project on CERN’s other experiments
and the requirement to shut down and diminish other venues to secure
the resources \textsuperscript{9}. The major risks considered were
budgetary and personnel. Alternate timelines were developed based
on potential funding level. The document further warned of the risks
associated with CERN’s large number of employees expected to retire
before the machines complete \textsuperscript{9}. The Project Charter
emphasized the need for rapid approval. The resolution to go ahead
was passed at that meeting, subject to detailed review in 1997 \textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{9}.


\subsection*{Planning}

The planning phase of the Large Hadron Collider project started as
early as 1995. Given the complexity and scale of the project, a variety
of special considerations had to be made when formulating the planning
process. Specifically,
\begin{itemize}
\item The time horizon of the project was long (multiple years) and consisted
of multiple phases;
\item The chain of command was complex and consisted of multiple teams;
\item The project dealt with cutting-edge technology and there was a high
degree of specialisation within the teams;
\item The project required coordination of a large number of people across
multiple countries \textsuperscript{10}.
\end{itemize}
These factors meant that extra care had to be taken in the planning
phase to ensure the project would go smoothly. Primarily, communication
and coordination were crucial, and the various sources of risk had
to be carefully managed.\textsuperscript{10}

To effectively deal with these complex factors, a series of planning
techniques was implemented. This included a focus on deliverables
and Work Units (WU) to split and measure work progress, as well as
the use of multi-level planning.\textsuperscript{10} Product Breakdown
Structures, Assembly Breakdown Structures, and Work Breakdown Structures
were all prepared, and regular reporting was utilized to ensure the
project stayed on schedule.\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{12}
Qualitative risk analysis was used to assess each risk \textsuperscript{11}.
Three different schedules were prepared, each with varying levels
of detail about project stages, consistent with their multi-level
planning model.\textsuperscript{11} However, the planning process
merged together with the execution phase throughout the project due
to the long time frame of the project as a whole. 


\subsection*{Execution}

The execution stage of the project involved important monitoring and
controlling process to keep on time, in budget and allocate resources
efficiently. The most important system used to monitor and control
the project was the EVM system. In order to ensure a formal process
for tracking progress, in 2001 CERN created a new EVM (Earned Value
Management) system, to replace the failed Excel-based system they
were using.\textsuperscript{13} Existing systems were inadequate
for CERN’s unique environment for technical reasons, requiring the
development of such a new, targeted system. The EVM system is built
around the concept of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).Tasks are
broken down into work units, whose progress would be tracked by the
individuals working on them. Expenditure was tracked and plotted against
time in an S-curve to monitor progress. \textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{14}
The system was designed to be compliant with ANSI \#748, though it
moves beyond the standard where required by the LHC project.

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part A/Execution evm\string".png}

This diagram illustrates EVM \textsuperscript{15}. It is possible
to monitor the cost variance and the schedule variance with what was
planned.

Due to the number of international stakeholders in the LHC project,
it was very important that there were regular, detailed reports for
the public. An annual report was issued \textsuperscript{14} containing
a detailed analysis of the project’s project so far. In the report,
in the executive summary, it detailed the current financial, technical,
scheduling and other issues in a simple way to be presented to important
overview committees and councils. The scheduling systems are described
in detail in the planning stage. Scheduling was monitored during the
execution stage. To fix scheduling problems there was comprehensive
monitoring processes including weekly planning meetings and a paperwork
process to make changes.

The progress reports’ purpose was to depict the actual status of the
project and to compare it to the planned progress. There are three
measures of progress report, which are: time progress report, physical
and worked time progress report found in annual and monthly progress
reports\textsuperscript{11}. 


\subsubsection*{Time progress report}

This report is for recording time elapsed and remaining for each task
and applied for master and coordination schedules. The procedure of
making the report is as follows:\textsuperscript{11} 

Physical and worked time progress report The physical and worked time
progress reports were designed to enable users to evaluate the performance
of the project and to see the overall progress. The principle behind
the progress estimation was to allocate progress values to individual
milestones. There are many ways to assess the physical progress between
milestones: for example, by manual estimation of the progress, by
assuming linear or Gaussian progress between milestone or by assuming
there is no change in progress between milestones. The figure below
is to help show the differences.\textsuperscript{11} Physical and
worked time progress report The physical and worked time progress
reports were designed to enable users to evaluate the performance
of the project and to see the overall progress. The principle behind
the progress estimation was to allocate progress values to individual
milestones. There are many ways to assess the physical progress between
milestones: for example, by manual estimation of the progress, by
assuming linear or Gaussian progress between milestone or by assuming
there is no change in progress between milestones. The figure below
is to help show the differences.\textsuperscript{11} \textsuperscript{8}\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part A/TPR 1 \string".png}


\subsubsection*{Physical and worked time progress report }

The physical and worked time progress reports were designed to enable
users to evaluate the performance of the project and to see the overall
progress. The principle behind the progress estimation was to allocate
progress values to individual milestones. There are many ways to assess
the physical progress between milestones: for example, by manual estimation
of the progress, by assuming linear or Gaussian progress between milestone
or by assuming there is no change in progress between milestones.
The figure below is to help show the differences.\textsuperscript{11} 

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part A/TPR 2\string".png}


\subsubsection*{Monthly progress report}

The monthly progress report was designated to record the works which
has been achieved in the period both qualitatively and quantitatively:
what (if any) problems appeared, their consequences and actions taken
to resolve the problem as well as the real status of the project compared
to the project plan. \textsuperscript{11}


\section*{Part B) Critically Analyse the Key Project Management Stages }


\subsection*{Concept}


\subsubsection*{Project Selection}

The project selection criteria used were necessarily rather different
from those used in a commercial venture. In particular, the quantitative
measures such as return on investment are not directly applicable
as the project makes no financial profit. The qualitative measures
remain the same, though there is much less emphasis on competition
in the scientific community: any advances are shared, though there
is a certain pride taken in discovery. 


\paragraph{Qualitative Measures Used For Project Selection }

Early in the LHC project’s concept phase -- 1984-1994 -- it was largely
kept going as a “sacred cow” of Carlo Rubbia, who became the CERN
Director General in 1989 \textsuperscript{1}. This can be seen in
his presentation to CERN council in 1991\textsuperscript{ 7} which
got the initial approval for him to organise the drafting of the Project
Charter. Even prior to becoming the Director General, Carlo Rubbia
had considerable influence within CERN as a Nobel prize winner in
the field of particle physics \textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{ 2}.

Brief consideration was given to the competitive advantage: to keep
Europe on the forefront of experimental physics \textsuperscript{ 5}.
However, this was not given much consideration as the international
scale of the project was so great \textsuperscript{14}. Indeed the
project was almost stopped in 1987, out of desire not to compete with
the US SSC \textsuperscript{1}. The increasing awareness of the international
scope of the project is reflected in the original proposal in 1991
taking great consideration for the European Committee for Future Accelerators
(ECFA) \textsuperscript{ 5}, whereas by 1994 the Project Charter
instead looks to the International Committee for Future Accelerators
(ICFA) \textsuperscript{ 3}. Competitive advantage was not a major
influence in the selection of the project.

Some examination was done to determine the comparative benefit of
other machines that could allow the required 1 TeV constituent collisions.
One such consideration was a Super Large Electron Positron Collider
(Super LEP). It was found that the cost of a Super LEP would be quadratically
related to the energy it could deliver, and was thus untenable \textsuperscript{ 5}.
Very strong emphasis was given to the LHC being the only machine that
could deliver this goal with current technology \textsuperscript{ 5}. 


\paragraph{Quantitative Measures Used For Project Selection }

Rather than considering how long it will take the profits from the
LHC to pay for it, (ROI), instead CERN considers the time taken for
its external funding to allow for the payment. The LHC delivers no
direct financial profits, so cannot pay for itself.

In the Project Charter the expected costs were outlined \textsuperscript{3}.
Extensive costing estimates were done in 1993, though the precise
details of these administrative records are sealed for 30 years \textsuperscript{16}.
Most cost estimates in the charter were done in Millions of Swiss
Francs (MCHF) at the 1993 level, though some were scaled in line with
Net Present Value measures\textsuperscript{17} taking into account
price differences in 1994 \textsuperscript{ 3}. Below is shown the
total projected expenses of CERN, compared to the member state contributions. 

\textsuperscript{8}\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/CERN finances chart\string".png}

We can see the gradual decrease in personnel costs, as CERN intended
to cut down on its employees \textsuperscript{ 3}. We also see the
sharp decline of the “Other Materials” costs; CERN was required by
the plan to shut down many of its other venues to fund the LHC. This
graph also highlights to the reader that CERN will be unable to pay
back all the debt created between 1994 and 2003 before the end of
the timeline. This brought to the attention of CERN council the need
to consider other funding options, which were brought forth in the
charter \textsuperscript{ 3}.


\subsubsection*{Project Management Structure }

\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/Project Org\string".png}

Above: Project Organization Chart, showing boards of governance, and
project leaders \textsuperscript{18}
\end{figure}


A project of this immense scale requires vast oversight and organization.
Where a typical “large” project might have had a cost in the hundreds
of thousands, or even millions of dollars, \textsuperscript{17} the
LHC’s cost was measured in the billions. A “large” project might typically
have had a time frame measured in months \textsuperscript{17}; the
LHC had a lead-time measured in decades. So whereas a “large” project
might have had a full time project manager or two and a steering committee
\textsuperscript{17}; the LHC had dozens of project managers, and
6 steering committees \textsuperscript{18}. The project organisation
chart from 2003 is displayed above and was continually updated as
the project’s needs evolved \textsuperscript{18}. This clear identification
of roles was crucial in the deliverance of the benefits of governance
\textsuperscript{17}.


\subsection*{Timing}

Much effort went to the positioning of the LHC within the structure
of experimental programs at CERN. Since it was to be built out of
the LEP tunnel, all LEP experiments needed to be completed before
construction on the SPS\textsuperscript{8} as an injector, which
was itself connected to the Proton Synchrotron (PS), there would be
large interruption to the use of many of its venues \textsuperscript{ 3}.
This is combined with the need to decrease other expenditures, and
thus the closure of some experiments such as the Low Energy Antiproton
Ring (LEAR). To give a big picture overview a Gantt chart was produced,
detailing all affected programs\textsuperscript{ 3} (below). It was
acknowledged as an ideal, and that a 2 year delay was likely before
the LHC was up and running \textsuperscript{ 3}

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/Timing\string".png}


\subsection*{Planning}

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/Planning proccess\string".png}

\textsuperscript{11}


\subsection*{Work Breakdown Structure \textsuperscript{8}}

Before detailed planning can occur it is necessary to prepare a work
breakdown structure to define the work that needs to be done, and
to do this the product breakdown structure and assembly breakdown
structure must first be constructed.

The product breakdown structure consists of:
\begin{itemize}
\item A product tree describing the complete configuration of the LHC;
\item Instructions on manufacturing, machining, quality control etc. for
each level and branch of the product structure, and
\item Technical description of the elementary parts, i.e. the leaves, of
the product structure.\textsuperscript{12} 
\end{itemize}
An example of a draft PBS for the installation of the dipole cryomagnets
is included below.\textsuperscript{12}

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/WBS\string".png}

Preparing the PBS required management staff to identify each component
and part of the LHC; including manufacturing, assembly and quality
control information in each branch of the PBS; and to further develop
rules of design and control to minimize risk in later stages of the
project. They were also required to authorise and conduct the collection
of product information and to create a database in which to store
and manage it.

Next, the assembly breakdown structure must be prepared, which consists
of: 
\begin{itemize}
\item A description of the time related sequence of activities needed to
be taken to complete the project
\item Part and activity related information that alter the original assembly
sequence given by the PBS
\item Other information related to the activities and the site, which influence
the WBS development 
\end{itemize}
A draft ABS is included below.\textsuperscript{12}

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/ABS\string".png}

LHC, and compliment the PBS with information about installation tasks.

These are both used in the construction of the overarching Work Breakdown
Structure. It outlines a list of specific work units needed to complete
a specific process or job, owned by the planning coordinators. These
work units: 
\begin{enumerate}
\item have one or more objectives
\item act as control points along with specific criteria for evaluating
performance
\item have known requirements of money, labour and other resources
\item have a named individual responsible for the outcome
\item have a relatively short life of about two months, maximum three\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{10}
\end{enumerate}
In addition, Gantt charts and resource allocation schedules were also
prepared. A copy of the working summary schedule used is detailed
below.\textsuperscript{19}

\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{\string"imgs/Part B/WSS Gantt\string".png}


\subsection*{Multi-level planning }

Multi-level planning is used and there are general requirement applied
for every schedule, which are:
\begin{itemize}
\item All of the schedule are to be marked-up weekly with Actual/Expected
start and finish Dates and be issued as Detailed Progress Mark-up
Schedules. The frequency depends on the type of schedule, weekly for
Detailed schedule and monthly for both Master and Coordination schedule
\item Shows the time span and Milestone of the project (when adequate)
\item Be presented in form of Gantt chart
\item Follow the Gantt chart, symbol, bar color/pattern code
\item The higher level schedules should be consistent with the tasks, Time
Spans, and Milestones dates contained in the lower level schedule.
\item Both Coordination and Detailed schedules shall be established using
network (precedence method) and resource analysis, in a sufficient
detail to demonstrate the logic and viability of the schedules.\textsuperscript{ 9}
\end{itemize}

\subsubsection*{Level 0 - Summary schedule}

A Gantt chart consist of 100 tasks shall be derived by rolling up
the Master schedule.\textsuperscript{ 9}


\subsubsection*{Level 1 - Master schedule}

The master schedule is issued by the planning coordinators together
with the schedule note at the beginning of the project. It is prepared
by planning coordinator and approved by project management, before
being used to assess progress of the project and communication outside
project team.\textsuperscript{11}

There are five Gantt charts and no more than 150 tasks in each schedule.
The master schedule covers the whole project from prototyping to commissioning.
It also shows the duration of the main tasks down to level 2 of the
Product Breakdown and Generic Activity Structures: highlighting the
critical paths.\textsuperscript{ 9}


\subsubsection*{Level 2 - Coordination schedule}

The coordination schedule is issued to key staff at early stage of
each major phases (e.g. design, procurement, manufacturing, etc.)
in form of five Gantt charts and consists of no more than 300 tasks
each\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{ 9}. It is prepared by
Planning Co-ordinator and verified by Technical group before being
approved by Project Management. When formally approved, It can be
given to suppliers and sub-contractors.\textsuperscript{11}

The schedule covers many things including R\&D (prototyping) and Design,
Tendering and Contracting (purchase orders and construction/installation
contracts), Manufacturing : from tooling up to series production and
delivery to CERN, Construction and Installation, Tests and Commissioning.
It shows relevance Interface Dates and detailed down to Work Units.
Also, the schedule shows highlight of critical paths and utilises
early start and early finish dates to identify floats.\textsuperscript{ 9}


\subsubsection*{Level 3 Detailed schedule}

The detailed schedule purposes are to show resources required to achieve
task available and to show the work is feasible in the time available.
It is prepared by either planning coordinator or technical groups,
verified by technical groups and approved by a planning coordinator
before being issued by the technical croup planners at the early stage
of the phase, together with a “schedule note”. It important to notice
that the schedule is only prepared for the immediate future (to cover
maximum of 4 months.)\textsuperscript{11}

The schedule covers the whole duration of a Work Unit or a group of
Work Units (Work Package). It shows relevant Interface Dates be detailed
down to elementary tasks.\textsuperscript{ 9}


\subsection*{Risk Analysis}

To manage the various sources of risks, there are two methods of risk
analysis that can be used: qualitative and quantitative. For speculative
R\&D projects such as the LHC, quantitative methods are costly and
produced limited results. For this reason, qualitative analysis was
employed, where the risks were identified at each stage of the project.
Multiple scenarios were simulated, schedules were created based on
these scenarios and the risks were analysed accordingly. \textsuperscript{ 9}

At the beginning of the project, the details of all the work units,
some of which would not start for ten years, was not known.\textsuperscript{ 9}
This meant that the WBS and schedules had to be periodically reviewed,
and new work units added as necessary. This is a unique problem with
large time-period projects like the LHC, where the planning phase
cannot necessarily be completed before the execution phase. As will
be explained later in this report, this caused a number of problems
during the execution phase and resulted in long delays in installation
and cost blowouts.


\subsection*{Execution and Monitoring}

For such a large-scale project the execution stage of the LHC project
was reasonably successful. However, there were some significant project
management problems which were partly responsible for time, cost,
specification and resources problems.

The most significant problem with the project management system was
identified during the execution stage in a 2001 Audit \textsuperscript{ 20}.
Initially, budgeting and cost control was the responsibility of the
LHC Project Administrator and Technical Planning and Scheduling was
under the LHC Project Technical Coordinator. There were no links between
the excel-based cost packages and work packages. During the 2001 audit
the Technical Coordinator identified that the project was behind schedule
and the Project Administrator identified the project was under-running.
The project was also found to have had a cost blowout of 330 million
Euros. This blowout meant that the completion date was pushed back
from 2005 to 2007. The project management team was not able to show
that the Estimate At Completion (EAC) was less than the Total Allocated
Budget (TAB). The CERN Member states asked LHC Project Management
to implement a project control system which became the deliverable-oriented
EVMS. The problems with the initial cost and schedule systems were
so significant that they had to be changed midway through the execution
phase. The new project control system combined measurements of schedule,
cost and specification. However, there were still problems with this
new system. 

The EVMS did not capture future extra costs identified due to problems
with civil engineering, contractors and integration. The extra costs
had to be absorbed by other savings through a ‘call on contingency’
process. Other problems identified by Bonnal \textsuperscript{ 20}
with the EVMS were the varying granularity of projects -- from kCHF
(Thousands of Swiss Francs) to MCHF (Millions of Swiss Francs) and
a few days to a few months -- too many activities (12000) for humans
to get on top of, the planned budgets being ‘too optimistic’ and weak
integrations with schedule networks. These problems with the EVMS
occurred because activities were put into the EVMS system without
any consideration for the managers and departments that had to make
sense of all of them. Due to the aforementioned technical problems,
the schedules were changed regularly through a comprehensive monitoring
processes. Even though it was possible to move around the scheduling
to keep to the important milestones throughout the project, it was
not ideal to have to change schedule regularly. The changes made pointed
to a problem with planning of budgets for contingencies, underestimating
the risks of contracts, a shortage of integration studies and a shortage
of staffing and availability of transport and handling \textsuperscript{14}.
These factors may have been overlooked by project management or simply
re-prioritized to fit the lean budgeting for the project. Another
problem that occurred with the project management in the execution
stage was the sheer volume of the databases that accumulated. In 2005
safety was compromised when a load fell on a worker and killed him.
This pointed to a big problem in their safety systems management.


\subsection*{Finalisation}

Finalisation in regards to the LHC project was not done especially
formally due to the staged and modular approach of the project. Many
of the aspects typically present in the finalisation phase occurred
alongside the long execution phase of the project, such as the distribution
and closing of individual work contracts and the continuous auditing
that took place.

Auditing and review took place both internally and externally and
at the very least there was one scheduled review of the project annually.
These audits focused on technical and cost-to-completion issues as
well as the managerial and resource-management aspects of the project
\textsuperscript{ 21}.

One such audit by the US department of energy found that cost estimations
for the LHC were reasonable and based upon CERN’s existing experience,
technical expertise, infrastructure and existing accelerator systems.
Construction schedules appeared feasible -- assuming funding goals
could be met -- and that there was considerable flexibility in the
deployment of resources. The committee found that the project had
experienced, technically knowledgeable and well-functioning management
systems in place complemented by a formal scheduling system philosophy
including the use of scheduling software packages \textsuperscript{ 22}.
Due to the high level of technical expertise required in the field,
and the fact that much of this expertise was already concentrated
at CERN, it is difficult to say just how effective and accurate the
audits were at their time of completion. From a post-project standpoint
however the LHC did manage to achieve its goals with the necessary
amount of funding and the technical knowledge that they had acquired.

Following the completion of the LHC and the commencement of the experiments,
a worldwide LHC computing grid was designed and deployed in order
to handle all the data of the LHC experiments. This system utilised
a decentralised grid that is located in across 200 locations in many
countries, providing the benefits of easy maintenance and upgrading
of the systems due to local institution funding whilst still contributing
to the global WLCG goals \textsuperscript{ 23}. The main responsibilities
of the WLCG are: safekeeping of raw data, distribution of raw data,
large scale reprocessing, handling analysis and simulation event production
and reconstruction \textsuperscript{ 24}.

In 2013 the LHC formally shut down to undergo future upgrades involving
replacements of major accelerators and luminosity upgrades. The ultimate
aim of the project is to achieve 14 TeV proton-proton collisions --
a tenfold increase in luminosity. This project is scheduled for completion
in 2015 and is known as CERN’s Super Large Hadron Collider experiment
(sLHC) \textsuperscript{ 25}.

Although the LHC project has formally finished, research utilising
the LHC data and results is still ongoing. The LHC has greatly contributed
to solving the fundamental issues of subatomic physics that arose
in the 20th century: specifically the nature of subatomic forces,
including discoveries in the behavioural differences of matter and
antimatter and the discovery of a fourth quark; the ‘charm quark’.
The next frontier for the LHC and the upgraded sLHC is the origin
of mass including the discovery of the Higgs Boson as predicted by
the standard model of physics \textsuperscript{ 26}. To this end,
the LHC will continue conducting experiments which attempt to answer
the following questions: 
\begin{itemize}
\item What is the origin of mass of particles? 
\item Why is antimatter so rare? 
\item Do super-symmetrical particles exist? 
\item What is dark matter? 
\item Does space-time have more than four dimensions?
\end{itemize}

\section*{Part C) Recommendations}

The LHC project did use the Project Lifecycle, however it was it was
a deformed version of it.

A Lot of planning was done in the concept stage. A lot of risk analysis
was done during the execution stage. Very little finalisation documentation
was produced. We suggest a more rigorous following of the Project
Life Cycle.

Triple Bottom line did not receive sufficient consideration. Partially
this was because of the limited relevance of a financial bottom line.
Even so this just highlights the importance of the environment and
social bottom lines. Significantly more work needed to be done to
consider the environmental and social impact of the project. Furthermore,
despite the LHC not providing a direct financial return, the return
in scientific knowledge was the primary goal of the project.


\subsection*{The Concept Stage}

While the concept stage was very long, it did not do many of the tasks
normally associated with the concept stage were not done. Very little
concern given at a high level to 
\begin{itemize}
\item Stakeholders other than those directly involved: Member and non-member
states, the scientific community.

\begin{itemize}
\item Even then very little detailed analysis carried out

\begin{itemize}
\item This may have resulted in the early funding issues \textsuperscript{1,2}.
\item All stakeholders should have been identified in this stage\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item to allow them to be engaged with as the project develops \textsuperscript{17}
\end{itemize}
\item Stakeholders, and the impacts on them should have been analysed using
techniques such a rainbow charts, comparing the influence on the project,
with the influence they have over it.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\item The Social Bottom Line

\begin{itemize}
\item Consideration was only given, to the impact on scientific society.
\item A specialised position on the governance board, or even the another
board, should have been established in the concept stage to ensure
this was covered.
\end{itemize}
\item Environmental Bottom Line

\begin{itemize}
\item We recommend again a specialised position on the governance board,
or even an additional board be established to provide high level oversight
to monitor environmental cost of the project as a whole. 
\end{itemize}
\item Risks.

\begin{itemize}
\item Almost no consideration was given to the Risks.
\item To analyse the Risks in the Concept stage, techniques such

\begin{itemize}
\item Brainstorming the Risks, to get a good overview.
\item Constructing Risk Matrices, with subject matter experts.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
The concept stage was overly concerned with planning, we recommend
the focus be shifted toward the consideration of risks, stakeholders,
and the triple bottom line.


\subsection*{The Planning Stage}

The planning phase of this project was poorly defined, and overlapped
with the execution phase. For example, the first general coordination
schedule was only constructed after civil engineering works had already
started.\textsuperscript{ 27} This was partly due to the nature of
the project, being a speculative R\&D project with a very long time
horizon. The exact work and processes that needed to be conducted
in the later stages of the project were largely unknown due to this
long time horizon, leading to an overlapping of the planning process
and the installation of the LHC. Risk analysis was also conducted
in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{11}

This was the cause of many problems in the execution stage. Miscommunication
between project teams and inconsistencies between the master schedule
and the coordination schedule caused the machine installation to be
conducted before the integration and spatial studies, which caused
long delays as the project could not proceed until the studies had
been completed.\textsuperscript{ 27} When technical problems arose
in January 2004 during cryogenic line installation, the lack of a
team dedicated to risk management mean\textsuperscript{8}t that it
caused major delays to the project\textsuperscript{ 27}. The schedules
were also found to be too optimistic in the face of these problems,
which was a direct result of the way the schedules were constructed.


\subsection*{The Execution Stage: }

Construction of the LHC proceeded before the systems were in place
to properly monitor it. Due to the complexity of the project (and
indeed the unique culture of CERN), many existing management tools
were not deemed directly applicable. A new software product (the aforementioned
EVM system) was developed, but was not introduced until midway through
the project. In an ideal project, these problems should have been
foreseen and solved before the execution phase began.

Furthermore, the detailed plans of some components of the project
were not finished before the execution phase began.

The main paper that was conducted during the project concept stage
in 1995 was by Bonnal \textsuperscript{11}. In this paper they considered
various systems to manage scheduling but no system had a method to
monitor costs and resourcing ag\textsuperscript{8}ainst scheduling.
Reading the paper it seems like they just didn’t appreciate the scale
of the project and how to manage so many different activities and
contracts. Perhaps more thorough consultation with stakeholders and
more investigation into literature on very large projects would have
prevented the budget blowout and the miscommunicating that were identified
in 2001. 

Possible improvements to the EVM system that would have helped solve
the problems identified in section B are to reduce and standardise
the number of activities input into the EVMS. Bonnal \textsuperscript{ 20}
recommended to have \textless{}500 activities, most the activities
in the range of 0.2-2\% BAC, and duration of activities between 3months
and 10\% of overall project duration. The problem with standardizing
the activities input into the EVMS is activities will be unnaturally
augmented/diminished to fit the required size, some information on
the activities may be lost, the individual groups completing these
activities may not be happy being forced to standardize the size of
their projects.

To overcome the scheduling problems with the EVMS a number of recommendations
were made in a paper by Barbero-Soto \textsuperscript{ 27}. To solve
contracting problems it recommends to split major contracts between
two firms (diversify). To overcome technical issues, especially in
the logistics area; perform spatial integration studies, setup special
‘rescue’ teams to deal with technical problems. These solutions have
problems in themselves. The main problem is that these extra steps
will cost money and there is a risk they may not be used during the
project because scheduling problems don’t arise.

The main solution for the problems with scheduling is to give the
resources to allow contingency time in each of the stages of the project
before the execution stage starts. This will avoid the costs of moving
the schedule planning around during the execution stage. Allocating
contingency time does include costs but the costs of doubling up schedules
is greater than this in general.


\subsection*{The Finalisation Stage}

A more formal finalisation process should have been adopted by CERN
at the closing of the LHC project. Contracts and delegated works should
have been officially concluded at the end of the project in addition
to the stages of completion to ensure all work had been done.

Lack of documentation of lessons learned and best practices would
prevent the tacit knowledge acquired to be easily transferred outside
of CERN. Although much of the scientific community, especially in
regards to particle colliders reside within CERN, it may be beneficial
for purposes such as external auditing for expertise to exist without
the organisation.

As a result the effectiveness of audits can be questionable as external
organisations do not have the sufficient knowledge, or for a project
of this scale, sufficient past examples to base their audits upon.
And instead they often rely on the preconceived expectations they
have of CERN.


\subsection*{Recommendations\textsuperscript{8} Conclusion}

Many of the problems with the Project Management can be related to
the use of technical people in management roles. The position of Project
Manager was known as Senior Physicist. The Director General -- and
project champion -- was a Nobel prize winning physicist \textsuperscript{ 2}.
The primary focus of these people was on the end goa\textsuperscript{8}l.
As could be seen even in the concept stage, the consideration was
made for how the final experiments would be done, rather than on how
the project was to be run \textsuperscript{ 3}. We recommend that
people with a stronger focus on -- and more experience with -- project
management be included within the project. In particular, people with
good knowledge of the Project Life Cycle and Triple Bottom Line should
be put in management positions. 

The main reason the Project Life Cycle was not adhered to was the
long timescale of the project. This meant that the details of what
needed to be done at each stage of the project were largely unknown
before construction began. This lead to phases of the Life Cycle running
into each other as concept, planning, and execution were all occurring
at once. To ensure a more rigorous adherence of Life Cycle management,
we recommend projects such as this should be conducted in stages:
whereby each phase of the Life Cycle is applied to each stage in turn
before moving on to the next stage. While this may make the project
more expensive, it would ensure greater control and monitoring of
the project at every stage, and reduce risk of problems during execution
and subsequent delays.


\section*{Conclusion}

The Large Hadron Collider is a very interesting project, quite atypical
of engineering projects in many ways. With its colossal scale, many
of the traditional project management t\textsuperscript{8}echniques
used broke down: it is difficult to plan a high-tech project decades
before its completion. Furthermore, the LHC was not a for-profit enterprise,
rather a scientific endeavour. This makes it very difficult to use
quantitative methods for determining Return on Investment. Similarly,
while any harm the project could have made to the environment was
minimized, it is difficult to see any definite positive environmental
effect; due to the very nature of science, exactly what will be discovered
is an unknown. Societal impact is easier to measure in the short term:
the LHC project will bring many scientists (and the occasional protester)
to France and Switzerland. Ultimately, the LHC had too little focus
on effective management -- at least initially -- and while the project
went relatively smoothly, it would have been useful to have had these
management systems from the beginning. 
\end{document}
